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AbsTRACT: With a focus on delivering low-cost, high-quality care, several organizations 
using the group employed model (GEM)—with physician groups whose primary and spe-
cialty care physicians are salaried or under contract—have been recognized for creating 
a culture of patient-centeredness and accountability, even in a toxic fee-for-service envi-
ronment. The elements that leaders of such organizations identify as key to their success 
are physician leadership that promotes trust in the organization, integration that promotes 
teamwork and coordination, governance and strategy that drive results, transparency and 
health information technology that drive continual quality improvement, and a culture of 
accountability that focuses providers on patient needs and responsibility for effective care 
and efficient use of resources. These organizations provide important lessons for health 
care delivery system reform.
                    
OvERviEw
The recent focus on improving the performance of the health care system has 
produced increasing awareness of the need to move away from uncoordinated 
fee-for-service payment.1 Compensation based on the volume and intensity of 
services provided to an individual, rather than on the value obtained from that 
care, offers no incentives for physicians to provide the optimal mix of services to 
achieve the best outcomes for their patients, or to coordinate services across mul-
tiple providers and settings. The payment system, moreover, undervalues primary 
care by paying more for procedural than for cognitive services. Furthermore, 
compensation generally is not available for some critical components of coordi-
nated care, such as transitional care after a hospital discharge or ongoing monitor-
ing of patients with chronic conditions. Without such compensation, these ser-
vices are frequently neglected, often resulting in additional costs to the system.
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Although the ACO label is relatively new, there 
are already organizations delivering low-cost, high-
quality care. One model that has had such success is 
the group employed model, or GEM.4 Physician groups 
operating under the GEM are typically composed of 
a large number of salaried primary care and specialty 
physicians, often aligned with other health care enti-
ties, including hospitals. Among these groups are some 
of the best-known and most widely recognized systems 
in the country. The experiences and lessons learned 
from them can inform the efforts of other organizations 
aiming to achieve more integrated care.
On September 16, 2009, the health services 
research and policy organization AcademyHealth 
hosted a colloquium that convened leaders from a 
dozen institutions that utilize the GEM. The goal was 
to identify the elements of that model that appear 
essential to producing high-quality, affordable care 
that is coordinated and patient-centered. This issue 
brief discusses the attributes that the organizations 
represented by these leaders have in common, and how 
recognition of those attributes may be helpful in the 
context of reforming the overall health care delivery 
system. The brief also examines factors that may have 
hindered the greater proliferation of these types of sys-
tems and presents recommendations for policymakers 
trying to reproduce aspects of this model.
wHAT is THE GROup EMplOyED MODEl?
The core of the GEM is a physician group whose 
primary and specialty care physicians are salaried or 
under contract.5 Compensation structures differ, but 
commonly include salary and incentives based on 
measures such as quality of care, patient satisfaction, 
and degree of involvement in the physician group. 
Physicians’ salaries also may be productivity-based, 
reflecting the primarily fee-for-service environment  
in which many GEMs operate. Importantly, such  
productivity-based measures are usually tied to the 
physician’s own work effort and not to the number  
of services that the physician may order for his or  
her patients.
Salary-based compensation, however neces-
sary, is not sufficient to ensure effective coordination 
of high-quality care. The majority of physicians in the 
United States report receiving either a performance-
adjusted or fixed salary, yet they do not always achieve 
the high-quality, low-cost care exemplified by GEMs.6 
The “salary” reported in many of these cases, however, 
may simply be describing what a physician chooses to 
pay him- or herself through a professional corporation, 
rather than reflecting the broader definition embod-
ied in the GEM. Moreover, the payment of salaries to 
physicians may not in itself be sufficient to explain the 
success of many of the organizations using the model. 
Nonetheless, although the application of the salary 
model varies across the individual organizations, it 
Creating more coordinated and accountable care requires organizations and systems of payment that align 
incentives across providers and care settings, so that coordinated, effective, and efficient care is encouraged and rewarded.2 
The development of accountable care organizations (ACOs) is one approach specifically proposed by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) to reform the delivery system and organize patient care. This law, signed by President 
Obama on March 23, 2010, would implement ACOs as part of a Medicare Shared Savings Program by 2012 and defines 
an ACO as a group of providers—which could include hospitals or physician groups, and other suppliers of services—that 
accepts responsibility for the cost and quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries within the traditional fee-for-service 
program.3 Participating groups would share with the federal government the savings achieved by providing high-quality, 
lower-cost care as determined by set performance and cost measures. Over time, the quality standards on which those 
incentives are based would become more rigorous to promote continual improvement, potentially by all providers. This bill 
encourages care coordination and collaboration among providers.
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certainly appears to be one of the important common 
elements enabling them to achieve their objectives.
The GEMs represented at the September 16 
meeting include some of the most widely recog-
nized leaders in health care organization and delivery 
(Appendix A). Although these organizations are similar 
with respect to their employment of physicians, their 
payment of salaries to physicians, and their emphasis 
on physician leadership, they also differ in various 
aspects. The ownership structure and the degree of 
vertical integration vary across groups: Some GEMs 
are not-for-profit foundations that contract with closely 
aligned medical groups to provide care; some contract 
with hospitals to provide care, while others have hospi-
tals that are integrated with the physician group; and in 
some cases, GEMs are aligned with health plans. Their 
catchment areas vary from populations of less than 
500,000 to populations of more than 5 million.
GEMs differ in their use of resources as well, 
but they tend to be relatively efficient. According to 
the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care’s “Hospital Care 
Intensity Index,” which measures the days patients 
spend in the hospital and the intensity of physician 
services during the last six months of life, most of the 
GEM hospitals operate in the quartile of hospitals that 
are the least resource-intensive.7 (For more information 
about each GEM, including descriptive and perfor-
mance attributes, see Appendix B.)
COMMOn FEATuREs iDEnTiFiED As 
inTEGRAl TO THE suCCEss OF GEMs
The GEM is an organizational model that can achieve 
high-value health care and optimal patient outcomes 
through aligned financial incentives that encourage 
more effective and efficient care. Although a few of 
the GEMs, such as Kaiser Permanente, receive most of 
their revenue on a capitated basis and are well-aligned 
with their hospitals, most operate in a predominantly 
fee-for-service environment. Despite the challenges 
resulting from the current payment system, GEMs have 
been able to improve the quality of care they provide 
and contain costs. The following section describes the 
attributes that GEM leaders believe are integral to their 
success and are important for other providers hoping 
to move toward a more integrated and better-organized 
delivery system.
physician leadership That promotes 
Organizational Trust and Cohesion
Physician leadership is critical in implementing poli-
cies that change care processes and physician behavior. 
Participants in the September 16 meeting note that 
when a physician leads an organization, there is a sense 
among the group’s physicians that the leader is “one 
of us.” The physician leader has had clinical training 
and likely shares the same values as the group physi-
cians while emphasizing the best interest of patients. 
A physician leader can clearly and credibly deliver the 
message that the organization’s mission is focused on 
the well-being of the patient, and can frame and trans-
mit that message from the physician’s perspective. This 
ability encourages rank-and-file trust, promotes greater 
cohesion among physicians, and creates support for 
organizational policies and strategy. When decisions 
are framed in the context of goals that matter to physi-
cians, such as access, quality, and operational excel-
lence, clinicians are more apt to support the necessary 
policies and tailor their practice behavior accordingly.
GEM participants note that physician leader-
ship is critical in developing and sustaining two char-
acteristics that are integral to supporting their ethos: 
collaboration and accountability. Collaboration among 
physicians is essential for providing high-quality, coor-
dinated care; physician leaders can implement policies 
that promote teamwork and foster interconnectedness 
and collegiality among physicians, and get buy-in 
from their medical staffs in assuming accountability 
for the results of their work. Physician leaders also can 
ease the strain of incorporating new physicians from 
private practice in the existing organization, as well 
as maintaining and adapting the organization’s culture 
when it expands into a new geographic area. When the 
Cleveland Clinic expanded its operations to Florida, 
for example, the clinic’s leadership found it difficult 
to incorporate the state’s local physicians into the 
Cleveland Clinic model of practice; the problem was 
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not resolved until physician leaders empowered local 
physicians to make their own decisions on how to align 
the organizational mission with the environment in 
which it was to be achieved.
integration That Encourages Teamwork 
and Coordination Across Care settings
Integration with hospitals is important as it instills 
accountability and promotes the coordination of 
care across inpatient and ambulatory care settings. 
Furthermore, physician–hospital integration can help 
align clinical and administrative strategies, such as 
physician recruitment, and promotes teamwork across 
all staff, including physicians, allied health care work-
ers, and registered nurses. However, integration can 
be difficult owing to misaligned financial incentives in 
the current payment system. For example, physicians 
practicing in a GEM may receive incentives to manage 
patient utilization—including avoiding hospital stays 
and minimizing hospital days—but such efficiencies 
could threaten the financial viability of hospitals that 
receive reimbursement for each stay or day. Changes in 
the current payment policy would improve the ability 
of GEMs to align physician and hospital incentives.
Some GEMs are part of a delivery system 
that is integrated with an affiliated health plan. This 
arrangement provides financial flexibility to allow 
the GEMs to experiment with delivery system initia-
tives. Such initiatives could include medical homes or 
population management for select chronic conditions, 
which can benefit the plan and its providers—as well 
as its patients—by promoting higher-quality care at 
reduced overall costs. Vertical alignment of a health 
plan, hospital, and physician group allows leaders to 
cross-subsidize services that are less profitable (or 
even totally uncompensated) under the current fee-for-
service system with funds from other services that are 
more profitable.
Governance and strategy That  
Drive Results
The leaders of GEMs believe that aligning the business 
strategy of the organization with a mission focused on 
patient care is important for creating trust and support 
within the organization. They are selective about the 
physicians they recruit to join and lead the group, 
seeking physicians whose values fit within the orga-
nizational culture, whose goals are consistent with the 
organization’s mission, and who are data-driven. At 
the time of hire, the GEMs set clear expectations about 
clinical performance, citizenship within the group, 
compensation, and the review process. Physician 
performance is reviewed and discussed periodically. 
Given physicians’ often competitive nature and desire 
to provide the best patient care, this process drives con-
tinuous quality improvement.
Compensation structures are designed to encour-
age behaviors that support the mission. Physicians 
who seek employment with GEMs often appreciate the 
stable nature of the model. The GEM leaders note that 
while the amount of compensation is important, other 
opportunities they can offer, such as teaching or con-
ducting research, are also important to the satisfaction 
of their physicians. Recognition from an individual 
physician’s peers that he or she is providing high- 
quality care is also meaningful. To build trust in the 
compensation structure, GEM leaders suggest that it  
be transparent, physician-led, and based on principles 
of fairness.
Engaging physicians in governance and opera-
tions is important, and can be encouraged through the 
appropriate governance structures. GEM physicians 
work within, and often lead, hospital departments. 
These leaders are responsible for the daily operations 
and delivery of care within the departments. Having 
GEM physicians lead hospital departments increases 
alignment between the two organizations and helps 
facilitate the coordination of care across settings. 
GEMs that base physician salaries on work effort usu-
ally offer separate compensation for those taking on 
committee and administrative functions. While some 
GEMs are the sole source of physicians for the hospital 
(i.e., the hospital has a closed medical staff), others 
admit patients to hospitals that have physicians not 
affiliated with the GEM on the medical staff (hospitals 
with an open medical staff). Engaging independent 
physicians to collaborate with those of the GEM in 
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guiding hospital operations can prove challenging; they 
often prefer not to take time away from their clinical 
practice, as their compensation is typically based on 
their own billing.
Transparency and Health iT That support 
Continuous Quality improvement
Continuous quality improvement cannot be achieved 
without focused, transparent metrics based on relevant 
data. Health information technology (HIT) not only 
aids in the coordination of individual patient care 
across settings, but also collects performance data that 
can be used to discuss quality with physicians during 
periodic reviews and to set organizational benchmarks. 
Additionally, GEM leaders suggested that while public 
reporting of the group quality metrics helps to drive 
performance improvement, public reporting at the 
individual physician level could lead to conflicting 
incentives deleterious to the group dynamic and sense 
of teamwork. Some GEMs share individual physician-
level data among physicians within the group.
Although the technology alone is certainly 
not sufficient, HIT and its effective use are helpful to 
GEMs in achieving their goals. (GEMs were perform-
ing well decades before HIT was invented.)
physicians’ Accountability for  
Their patients
A pervasive theme mentioned by the GEMs repre-
sented at the September 16 meeting was a sense of 
both individual physician and group accountability for 
patient care and practice patterns. Physicians not only 
feel responsible for their own patients, but also recog-
nize the responsibility of the organization toward its 
patients collectively. Physicians are also accountable 
to a physician leader and are held to expectations that 
are clearly set forth when they are hired and explicitly 
tracked over time. The leaders of the GEMs emphasize 
that physicians are accountable for their patients’ care 
across the care continuum. Accountability encourages 
physicians to view with a broader perspective the care 
their patients receive and to coordinate patient  
care appropriately.
ORGAnizATiOns THAT THRivE in A  
TOxiC EnviROnMEnT
The GEMs provide a clear example of an analog to an 
“existence proof”; they achieve in the current system 
many of the goals of a high-performing health delivery 
system. In most instances (the exception being GEMs 
within fully integrated delivery and payment systems 
like Kaiser Permanente), this is in spite of operating at 
least in part within a fee-for-service payment environ-
ment with incentives that conflict with the organiza-
tions’ objectives. Several issues, however, arise when 
considering the role of GEMs in reforming the health 
care delivery system.
The question many people ask is, “If GEMs are 
such a good idea, why aren’t there more of them and 
why don’t we see more recently developed GEMs?” 
Unless we can answer that question, GEMs may turn 
out to be a policy solution that fails to deliver funda-
mental change outside of the few areas in which they 
already exist. Currently, GEMs are not as rare as the 
question implies: They care for roughly 6 percent of 
the American population and do so in a wide variety 
of environments, from highly urbanized to quite rural. 
Their leaders identify many common traits that they 
feel are important aspects of GEM performance. Some, 
such as a clear mission and strong physician leader-
ship, may be quite difficult to incorporate in legisla-
tion or regulation (although they may provide good 
examples for other organizations with similar aspira-
tions); others, such as salary or employment, can be 
easily specified. Before policymakers focus on such 
details, however, it is worth discussing these traits in 
more depth.
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if GEMs Are such a Good idea . . .
The concerns about the replicability of the GEM 
concept are real and need to be addressed. The GEM 
representatives highlighted several features that char-
acterize the organizations’ success and that may help 
explain their relatively small numbers. Leadership 
always seemed to be at the top of the list; but leader-
ship is often discussed as a core feature of most suc-
cessful organizations and is often in short supply. It 
is important, however, to consider the “package” of 
characteristics discussed above that are encompassed 
by the GEMs.
Although many of the GEMs are not-for-profit 
or operate as not-for-profit foundations contract-
ing with a medical group, few would argue that the 
physicians in the groups have taken vows of poverty. 
However, although the “group” may be owned by its 
physicians, it generally has no external shareholders, 
which means that there is no external source of capital 
that can be tapped to build the entity. In GEMs, as well 
as in not-for-profit hospitals and health plans, growth 
is essentially internally financed or financed with bor-
rowed funds.
Building this model was far less problematic 
decades ago when the GEMs began and the fixed costs 
of establishing medical practices, especially those with 
a broad range of primary care and specialty physicians, 
were far lower than they are today. Capital costs for 
even a moderately sized medical office building now 
are enormous, so establishing a new “stand-alone” 
medical group is much more likely to require outside 
investors, or the provision of publicly sponsored “seed 
money” such as was previously supplied to hospitals 
by the Hill-Burton Act, passed initially in 1946 and 
amended in 1975.
While physician entrepreneurs are not common-
place, neither are they unusual. While entrepreneurial 
behavior is not what characterizes the GEMs, they 
typically have strong leaders who are able to attend to 
the business aspects of care delivery. The issue here is 
not one of business acumen, but of the role of risk and 
reward. Part of what seems to characterize GEMs is 
their interest in providing high-quality medical care to 
their patients while allowing their physicians to earn 
reasonable incomes. Discussions with GEM leaders 
resound with the terms “sustainability and fairness,” 
not “risk and profits.”
Entrepreneurs are drawn to high-risk, high-
profit situations and often are willing to ride a venture 
up and then leave when it fails. GEMs, in contrast, are 
notable for having succeeded with a different business 
model that is not optimized for performance in the cur-
rent environment, yet manages to survive. Given the 
high capital requirements for building new GEMs, it is 
not surprising that few have been developed in the last 
half-century. Moreover, many GEMs were developed 
in geographic areas with a limited supply of health care 
services. Given the current distribution and supply of 
medical care across the United States, new GEMs will 
likely form through mergers and acquisitions of exist-
ing health care facilities. The ways in which GEMs 
grew in an environment where the overall system was 
expanding may not be repeated in one that requires 
contraction, especially in certain specialty areas. A 
strategy of mergers may increase both efficiency and 
antitrust concerns, making design of the appropriate 
policies more complex.8 Whether we would see new 
forms of GEMs develop if purposefully stimulated by 
a different payment system is impossible to determine 
merely by looking at them in retrospect, but it is easy 
to see why these systems are not more prevalent in the 
current environment.
There are some lessons that can be learned, 
however, from the existing GEMs. With the excep-
tion of organizations like the Cleveland Clinic and 
Mayo Clinic, which have very large specialty referral 
practices, GEMs have a much higher ratio of general-
ists to specialists than one sees in the overall medical 
care system. Implicitly, they have recognized that by 
providing mainly primary care, the relatively fewer 
specialists can be kept very busy doing only what is 
necessary for their patient populations. By adding 
specialists only as the primary care population grows, 
GEMs reduce the incentive for their specialists to offer 
services of marginal value. If this observation is borne 
out, then as accountable care organizations grow and 
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them does not benefit directly from the revenue  
they generate.
The “groupness” of GEMs probably also has 
an indirect effect on incentives. Whereas some profes-
sional corporations allow each member to set his or 
her own salary, the GEMs typically have a compensa-
tion committee that sets the structures of the salaries, 
often allowing some variation based on performance 
it would like to reward, such as productivity, quality, 
and patient assessments. Discussions within the group, 
which are likely to address the consequences of salary 
structure for its long-term viability, as well as what the 
members see as being fair, also help determine how 
incentives are structured. A GEM may even decide to 
reduce its revenue per patient in order to become more 
attractive to certain payers and gain more favorable 
contracting terms.
The employment structure also may allow the 
group to make collective decisions that would be dif-
ficult for individual clinicians to undertake separately. 
For example, electronic health records (EHRs) can 
help make data conveniently available for a given 
patient, and more sophisticated EHRs allow a wide 
range of comparative analyses that can support clini-
cal decision-making and alter clinician behavior. Since 
designing an EHR system for the latter function is far 
more complex and costly, the easier strategy, absent 
“buy-in” by all the relevant physicians, is for each indi-
vidual physician to order the minimum EHR system 
(or none). By contrast, a GEM, operating as a group, 
is able to raise the capital to finance EHR systems that 
best suit the group’s (and their patients’) needs and 
make a collective decision that benefits all.
lessons for the Development of ACOs
GEMs are “naturals” to be able to operate as ACOs 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
Some are already parts of formal health plans; oth-
ers have the capability to organize to promote qual-
ity improvements and achieve measurable savings. 
Moreover, physician leadership, physician account-
ability for the group’s patients, and physician selectiv-
ity, all key attributes of GEMs, are seen by some ACO 
develop, they will need relatively fewer specialists than 
generalists. Such selective recruiting may be a chal-
lenge in developing the organization.
what Does “Employment” Mean in the 
Context of the GEM?
Without in-depth case studies, it is impossible to under-
stand the full implications of the employment relation-
ships and expectations in each GEM. Moreover, the 
selection, vetting, and trial period process for new 
recruits can be used to ensure that one is dealing only 
with physicians who will both be comfortable with, 
and operate in a manner consistent with, the expecta-
tions of the group. Some of these expectations may be 
formal, but many may be informal.
The nature of an employment relationship, how-
ever, is quite different from that of a solo practitioner 
or partnership structure. GEMs have organizational 
expectations and, if necessary, mechanisms to enforce 
those expectations. That sets them apart from small 
or medium-sized medical groups that share business 
office expenses and rent, but allow each practitioner to 
set his or her own salary, essentially based on revenues 
less shared expenses. Physicians in such groups may 
technically be employees for tax and other purposes, 
but they function much more as independent entities.
GEMs, in contrast, seem to use the employ-
ment relationship to reshape how the incentives of 
the fee-for-service system impact physicians. Current 
fee structures typically offer greater rewards for tests, 
imaging, and procedures than for physician time. For 
tests and imaging, the fees essentially reflect a com-
bination of physician work effort on one hand and, on 
the other, a return on the investment in the plant, equip-
ment, and other labor needed to produce the tests and 
images. The GEM as an organization can bear the costs 
and responsibility for the latter, and likewise reaps the 
“profits” from those activities. Those “profits” may 
then be used for investment in growth, or for the cross-
subsidization of primary care practitioners. This sepa-
ration also blunts the incentive to overuse such tests 
and imaging since the individual clinician ordering 
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thought leaders as essential to the successful imple-
mentation of ACOs. (See Appendix C for ACO thought 
leaders’ reflections on how the GEM can inform and 
facilitate efforts to implement ACOs.)
The history of health maintenance organizations 
is instructive. Prior to the early 1970s, there was good 
evidence that prepaid group practices performed quite 
well, but the closed nature of those organizations was 
anathema to many individual physicians as well as to 
the American Medical Association. When a new name, 
HMO, was created to encompass not just prepaid 
groups but the loosely organized independent practice 
association model (IPA), political support became 
available for the concept. Not all IPAs performed well, 
and many failed, but the HMO Act of 1973 had major 
positive effects on transforming the delivery system. 
Likewise, the ACO concept is much broader than the 
GEM. Requiring less formal structure than GEMs, 
some ACOs may take less time to create. With less 
integration, however, some ACO models pose greater 
antitrust concerns.
Creating GEMs has been difficult in the current 
payment environment; we should see more such groups 
developing if the payment system is altered to facilitate 
ACOs and other types of care coordination. Will new 
GEMs develop quickly enough to achieve short-term 
cost savings? Only time will tell, but policymakers are 
unlikely to place all their bets on GEMs to achieve the 
desired savings. The GEM experience, however, offers 
important lessons for those seeking to create ACOs 
without incorporating all the GEM infrastructure. Such 
models of ACOs could include physician–hospital 
organizations, virtual ACOs formed through contracts, 
or independent practice associations.
One lesson is that, if savings are to occur, funds 
need to be implicitly transferred from the set of clini-
cians and facilities providing interventional and high-
cost testing/imaging services to those offering primary 
care. While theoretically this could be done within a 
formal organization such as a new ACO, it is unlikely 
that many providers will willingly accept a reduction 
in their current incomes. The best way, then, to achieve 
the transfer is to mimic the GEMs by having a lower 
ratio of interventionists to primary care practitioners, 
thereby allowing those in the former category within 
the ACO to be very busy, but with fewer interventions, 
hospitalizations, and other forms of specialty care per 
patient. The changed ratio might be accomplished 
through selective recruiting—based on specialty and 
quality—of clinicians into a new ACO. 
The lesson from the GEMs with respect to col-
lective decision-making and capturing revenues as they 
are received, rather than asking physicians to give up 
income they already have received, may also inform 
the structure of various ACO models. Although a GEM 
may be the best long-term solution, careful attention 
needs to be paid to the transitions necessary to get 
there. Joining an existing GEM is one thing, but suc-
cessful physicians in independent practice are unlikely 
to be persuaded to come together to create a new ven-
ture that requires them to accept major changes to their 
autonomy, compensation, and referral relationships. It 
has been suggested that ACOs, and therefore GEMs, 
could receive bonuses based on superior performance 
and use those bonuses to fund their infrastructure. 
Conceptually, this make sense, but it may be far better 
for the ACO to handle billing and other services for the 
participating clinicians with agreements that certain 
budgeted amounts will be taken “off the top” for col-
lective purposes. The ACO would take on the business 
office, health information technology, and other func-
tions that the GEMs provide. The core functions would 
then have the guaranteed revenue stream and bonuses 
dependent on superior performance. The physicians 
might still be independent practitioners, but would be 
paid in a manner collectively determined by the mem-
bers of the ACO, with incremental payments reflecting 
the desired incentives.
Efforts to create ACOs also will benefit from an 
understanding of how GEMs provide support to physi-
cians. ACO thought leaders believe it is essential to 
create a supportive environment for physicians in order 
to overcome what they perceive to be the greatest bar-
rier to forming ACOs—gaining physician acceptance. 
Physicians doubt that such models will achieve high-
quality and low-cost care and fear that public reporting 
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of quality measures will increase physician liability 
exposure. By providing mechanisms offered by GEMs, 
such as incentives for professional development and 
the infrastructure for professional and administrative 
support, ACOs may be able to recruit enough physi-
cians to achieve the critical mass necessary for such 
organizational models.
Aside from showing how the ACOs might get 
the economic incentives correct, as individual enti-
ties the GEMs have another advantage that would be 
helpful if applied in the development of ACOs, i.e., 
the sharing of clinical data for quality improvement 
and other purposes, as well as peer review of medi-
cal practices. Also useful would be GEMs’ experience 
with important federal and state laws and regula-
tions (including the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, or HIPAA), which would 
help ACOs comply with such regulations.
implications beyond the Context  
of Medicare
The ACO concept is applied in the current legislation 
primarily to address problems in Medicare expendi-
tures, but most would agree that the overuse of certain 
services, and perhaps the underuse of others, is wide-
spread and occurs regardless of who the payer is. Many 
clinicians prefer to identify what they believe is the 
best clinical strategy for a specific health problem and 
use that for all patients, regardless of the insurer. That 
is not to say, however, that payer mix does not affect 
clinician behavior, nor that the ability to cross-subsi-
dize is irrelevant.
System change can be facilitated by the develop-
ment of ACOs for Medicare patients, but it would help 
if those new structures also worked for non-Medicare 
patients. For example, suppose that new billing codes 
were developed for telephone consultations, either with 
patients or with other physicians, such as subspecial-
ists, to decide whether a referral is warranted. It would 
be problematic if public policy restricted those codes to 
Medicare patients; making them readily accessible for 
other payers would be desirable.
FACTORs THAT COulD FACiliTATE THE 
FORMATiOn OF MORE GEMs
As described above, the existing GEMs, now well-
established organizations, are nonetheless survivors in 
a toxic fee-for-service payment environment that does 
little to foster coordination of care, and their leaders 
believe that environment has prevented the formation 
of many more. The following actions were identified as 
potential facilitators to help other organizations move 
toward more integrated systems that achieve high-
value, patient-centered care.
payment Reform
Payment reform is seen as the key to encouraging inde-
pendent physicians to form real or virtual relationships 
with other providers to deliver high-quality patient 
care. Payment approaches that encourage collaboration 
among physicians would be the first step toward the 
development of more integrated and accountable orga-
nizations. The following payment reforms would help 
to encourage collaborative, low-cost, high-quality care:
Payments for coordinating care•	 . Additional pay-
ment for coordinating care would help patients 
receive care from the wide range of independent 
providers they may need to see. It should also 
encourage physicians to collaborate across the 
care continuum, particularly in the sharing of 
data, and may lead to virtual and/or real integra-
tion between providers and care settings.
Incentive payments for quality and efficiency at •	
the community level. Medicare and other payers 
could more broadly adopt the shared savings 
approach being used in some current initiatives 
and discussed in the context of health reform, 
with groups of providers being rewarded for 
slowing the rate of growth of expenditures 
for their patients, subject to the requirement 
that quality is not jeopardized. Under such an 
approach, independent physicians and hospi-
tals are likely to find that by sharing their data 
and coordinating their care, they can achieve 
significant savings that could pay for the 
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extra infrastructure needed to achieve those 
efficiencies.
Differential sustainable growth rate (SGR)•	 . The 
current SGR formula constrains overall physi-
cian fee increases based on the overall rate of 
growth in total physician expenditures. If the 
SGR is to be continued, consideration should be 
given to enhanced SGRs for physicians to move 
into more integrated organizations. Participation 
would be voluntary, and this policy lever could 
be implemented to be budget-neutral overall.
Bundled payments at the episode level•	 . Bundled 
payments for episodes of care should promote 
integration and collaboration among providers, 
and especially between physicians and hospitals. 
Bundling payments or setting global fees for a 
particular condition or group of conditions, e.g., 
by combining the hospital’s diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) payment and the physician fees 
associated with the episode of care, should also 
encourage greater teamwork and more efficient 
use of resources. This bundling could go further 
and include readmissions within a certain period 
of time, appropriate preadmission testing and 
imaging, and encouraging links between the 
inpatient and ambulatory settings.
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation•	 . 
Such a center, which would be established by 
2011 by the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, would have the authority to foster 
experimentation with alternative payment 
methodologies—such as the salaried models 
used by the GEMs—that promote high-quality, 
low-cost care. It would allow organizations that 
provide coordinated, effective, and efficient care 
to thrive and encourage development of more 
organizations seeking similar goals.
Other policy Changes
In addition to payment reforms, the following initiatives 
could help to create more integrated systems of care:
Robust and meaningful definition of HIT and •	
subsidies for implementing HIT. Diffusion 
of HIT could assist the coordination of care 
across the care continuum and the collection 
of performance metrics that can drive quality 
improvement. Appropriately used HIT, and pref-
erential funding of HIT for GEMs or ACOs that 
use it effectively, could also facilitate clinical 
integration.
Enterprise liability•	 . Enterprise liability would 
shift professional liability risk from individual 
providers to provider organizations. When phy-
sicians carry their own liability coverage, they 
often resist process changes for fear of being 
held liable in the event of a bad patient outcome. 
Enterprise liability that covers both the hospital 
and the physicians focuses organizations on 
providing staff with the appropriate training and 
expertise to undertake various tasks, and encour-
ages the reengineering of processes to reduce 
cost and risk to patients.
Loan forgiveness•	 . To encourage newly trained 
physicians to seek employment in a GEM or 
other ACO, the federal government could pro-
vide loan forgiveness for primary care physi-
cians who choose to work in this type of setting.
Technical assistance•	 . Technical assistance 
provided by the private sector, but potentially 
funded by (or at least organized and supported 
in part by) the public sector, could assist with 
the movement toward more integrated systems 
of care. Existing GEMs also could provide 
technical assistance to groups hoping to become 
more integrated.
Public funds to promote the development of •	
GEMs. The federal government could provide 
physician groups with sufficient capital to stim-
ulate the development of GEMs.
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COnClusiOns
The performance of the GEMs offers hope to those 
who believe the health care system can be made to 
be more efficient, effective, and responsive, even 
in the context of U.S. laws, regulations, and values. 
The success of GEMs in the current environment is 
notable; that environment and the gradual changes in 
the system help explain why they have not proliferated 
more widely. Impending payment and delivery system 
reforms resulting from the passage of health reform 
should, however, make the environment more condu-
cive to this type of organization.
An important function of GEMs has been 
to begin to shift the balance of health care delivery 
back toward primary care. This shift could actually 
be achieved much more rapidly and effectively if the 
payment and delivery reforms described above were 
enacted and implemented, encouraging the prolifera-
tion of new GEMs and other organizations that would 
be more accountable for the quality and efficiency of 
their patients’ care. The goal, however, is not necessar-
ily to shift the relative hourly compensation for work 
effort across specialties (although that should not be 
ruled out) but to reduce the profits that some physicians 
can reap by ordering and delivering tests, imaging, and 
other services regardless of the likelihood that they 
will contribute to patients’ health. Another approach 
to replicating what the GEMs appear to have achieved 
would be to add specific payments to compensate for 
the coordination of care without face-to-face contact 
between physicians and patients. Such coordination 
also should allow for the provision of some services 
by less highly trained, specialized personnel under the 
supervision of physicians and organizations who take 
responsibility for patient outcomes.
Leadership is a key feature of all existing 
GEMs, and in the creation of effective ACOs leader-
ship may be even more important. The ACO is sup-
posed to be a transformative entity, changing how 
physicians practice, introducing them to new and 
different ways of organizing care, compensation, and 
management of risk. Some of the physicians who will 
be needed are already doing quite well in the existing 
system; those who have the most to gain from a new 
organization probably also have the least time to take 
on new roles. One lesson to be learned from the GEMs 
is that, even with attractive financial incentives, physi-
cians are unlikely to change what they do in order to 
join an organization that is not under physician control.
GEMs demonstrate that high-performing health 
care systems can function and sometimes thrive in 
the United States, even in the current nonsupportive 
fee-for-service environment. With reform of the pay-
ment system, GEMs may be able to do even better 
than they have to date. The lessons from the GEMs, 
moreover, are critical to discussions regarding the cur-
rent policy interest in ACOs. Among those lessons are 
that ACOs will need to address issues of clinical and 
economic integration, achieve the appropriate balance 
of clinicians, and ensure forward-looking leadership. 
Developing the organizational and legal structures, the 
governance and culture, and the technological innova-
tions necessary for constant improvement will be a 
challenge. It is only by changing the delivery system, 
however, that we will be able to achieve the goal of 
higher-quality care at sustainable cost.
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Appendix A. Organizations Represented at the GEM Colloquium
Sept. 16, 2009
Bassett Healthcare,·  Cooperstown, N.Y. Founded in 1927, the physician-run organization is composed of 260 
employed physicians in an integrated not-for-profit corporation directed by a board of trustees.
Billings Clinic,·  Billings, Mont. The Billings Clinic was founded in 1911 and became a fully integrated organiza-
tion with Deaconess Medical Center, forming a not-for-profit medical foundation, in 1993. The physician-led 
organization is composed of 238 employed physicians, a 245-bed acute-care hospital, and seven community 
clinic branch sites.
Cleveland Clinic,·  Cleveland, Ohio. Founded in 1921, the physician-led organization is composed of 1,800 phy-
sicians. The main hospital is integrated with the physician group, and the group has facilities in Florida, Toronto, 
Canada, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
Geisinger Health System,·  Danville, Pa. Founded in 1915, Geisinger Health System is a physician-led, integrated 
delivery system composed of two acute-care hospitals, a health plan, and a medical group of 745 physicians. The 
physicians are employed in the Geisinger Clinic, under the corporate umbrella of the Geisinger Foundation.
Gundersen Lutheran Health System,·  La Crosse, Wis. Founded in 1995, Gundersen Lutheran Health System is 
a physician-led integrated delivery system composed of a health plan, a medical group, and a physician-owned 
acute-care hospital. The medical group, Gundersen Clinic, was founded in 1891 and comprises 453 employed 
physicians.
Guthrie Health,·  Sayre, Pa. Founded in 1910, Guthrie Health is a physician-led organization that includes three 
acute-care hospitals and the Guthrie Clinic, a medical group composed of 245 employed physicians.
Henry Ford Health System, · Detroit, Mich. Founded in 1915, Henry Ford Health System is an integrated deliv-
ery system composed of six acute-care hospitals and a medical group of nearly 1,100 employed physicians. The 
medical group is led by a physician CEO who also serves as an executive vice president of the system.
Lahey Clinic,·  Burlington, Mass. Founded in 1939, Lahey Clinic is a physician-led organization with a group 
practice composed of 550 physicians. The group owns one hospital.
Marshfield Clinic, · Marshfield, Wis. Founded in 1916, Marshfield Clinic is a physician-led organization com-
posed of approximately 750 employed physicians. The group owns a hospital and is affiliated with a health plan.
Mayo Clinic,·  Rochester, Minn. Founded in the late 1800s, the Mayo Clinic is the first integrated, multispecialty, 
not-for-profit group practice. The physician-led organization is composed of 3,700 employed physicians and 
provides clinic and hospital services at its locations in Rochester, Minnesota; Jacksonville, Florida; Phoenix and 
Scottsdale, Arizona; and 70 communities in southern Minnesota, northern Iowa, and western Wisconsin, known 
as the Mayo Health System. (Authors’ note: Leaders from Mayo Clinic were invited to the colloquium but were 
unable to attend.)
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Palo Alto Medical Foundation, · Palo Alto, Calif. The Palo Alto Medical Clinic was founded in 1930, and the 
Palo Alto Medical Foundation was founded in 1981. Palo Alto Medical Foundation is affiliated with Sutter 
Health. The group is physician-run and composed of 905 employed physicians.
The Permanente Medical Groups, · Oakland, Calif. The Permanente Medical Groups include seven medi-
cal groups that operate under a federated structure and have permanent business relationships with Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals. This paired organization is known as Kaiser Permanente. The self- 
governed medical groups include approximately 15,000 employed physicians.
Scott and White Healthcare, · Temple, Texas. Established in 1897, Scott & White Healthcare is a not-for-profit, 
physician-led integrated delivery system composed of 10 hospitals or hospital partners, more than 50 clinics 
throughout central Texas, a health plan, and a medical group of approximately 800 employed physicians  
and researchers.
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Appendix C
How Do GEMs Fit Within the Movement Toward Accountable Care Organizations?
Given the diversity of health systems—with respect to geographic location, population served, workforce, and orga-
nizational structure—experimentation is needed across the country to derive and apply lessons from different models 
to achieve accountable care. Some communities and provider organizations are currently experimenting with various 
models of real or virtual integration. The GEM is an example of an established model that achieves outcomes con-
sistent with the goals inherent in the accountable care organization (ACO) concept. The lessons learned from GEM 
organizations can inform the efforts to establish both similar and new models of integrated care. To understand how 
the GEM model fits within the movement toward ACOs, AcademyHealth asked ACO thought leaders John Bertko, 
of RAND and the Brookings Institution, Elliott Fisher, of Dartmouth Medical School, Mark McClellan, of the 
Brookings Institution, and Aaron McKethan, also of the Brookings Institution, to reflect on how the GEM can inform 
and facilitate efforts to implement ACOs, and to discuss policy levers that would promote the movement toward ACOs.
Attributes of GEMs That Are Most Important for ACOs
The ACO thought leaders believe that GEM systems would certainly fit within the parameters of an ACO model. 
While many of the attributes of the GEM are important for achieving the collaborative care sought in the ACO 
model, not all are necessary for organizations to become ACOs. For example, employing physicians is just one of 
several possible ways to achieve-high quality, low-cost care—the key task is to design better alternatives to the 
incentives inherent in the current fee-for-service payment system. The ACO thought leaders suggest that formal con-
tracts between provider organizations, such as independent practice associations (IPAs) and hospitals, may be able 
to achieve the desired alignment of incentives; in such contracts, providers would agree to work together, implement 
some type of internal payment mechanism that supports the greater goals of the ACO, collaborate to achieve high-
quality care, and develop performance measures that are reflected in compensation. Some GEM leaders, on the other 
hand, believe that virtual ACOs will not be enough to achieve high-quality, low-cost care. While they believe that the 
ACO concept is good and should be promoted, they suggest that the more integrated organizational models will be 
more adept at achieving high-quality, low-cost care. 
The physician leadership, physician accountability for the group’s patients, and selectivity that are key attri-
butes of GEMs are also viewed by the ACO thought leaders as essential to the successful implementation of ACOs. 
They believe, however, that accountability for patient care can be achieved through the contractual process. The abil-
ity of GEMs to select the physicians they want in the group is important because it assures that selected physicians 
“buy in” to the overall goals of the organization. To assess whether an individual physician provides high-quality care 
requires having the capacity to generate accurate quality data for that physician.
The ACO concept is considered by the thought leaders to be a facilitator in achieving high-quality, low-cost 
care, rather than the sole solution for improving the quality of care. Mechanisms to achieve care coordination and 
disease management are needed to realize desired results, and the ACO model would provide an environment that 
supports such practices. The GEM already has many of those mechanisms in place. In fact, the GEM may be one of 
the more successful existing examples of an ACO. A Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Urban Institute brief by 
Kelly Devers and Robert Berenson lists some of the organizational models that could potentially function as ACOs 
and the extent to which each model meets desired characteristics of more structured and accountable systems (see 
table). The authors note that the long-term success of ACOs is dependent on the ability to address the financial, orga-
nizational, regulatory, and legal barriers to implementing such entities.15
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Organizational Models That Could Serve as Accountable Care Organizations
Provider Type
Ability to provide  
or manage care 
across continuum
Ability to plan 
budgets and 
resource needs 
(accept and 
manage non-FFS 
payment)
Provider 
inclusiveness
Level of 
performance 
accountability
IPA Low/Medium Medium High Medium
Multispecialty group Medium/High Medium Low/Medium Medium/High
Hospital medical staff organization Medium Low/Medium Medium Low/Medium
PHO Medium/High Medium/High Low/Medium Medium/High
Organized or integrated delivery 
systems Medium/High Medium/High Medium Medium/High
Virtual approach–extended hospital 
medical staff Medium Low/Medium High Low
Source: K. Devers and R. Berenson, “Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?” The Urban Institute/
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues, Oct. 2009.
Barriers to Forming ACOs and Ways That the GEM Model Can Help
The ACO thought leaders believe that transitioning private practice physicians into more organized systems of care 
will be one of the greatest challenges to forming ACOs. Not only are there technical and legal barriers, such as draw-
ing up contracts between providers and organizations, but there are also challenges relating to physician support for 
the concept. These thought leaders believe there is a sense of doubt and skepticism among many providers that mov-
ing toward such models of care will achieve the desired outcomes. Many physicians are also concerned that public 
reporting will increase physician liability. As community providers begin trying to implement ACOs, one of the big-
gest challenges they face is putting in place specific strategies that improve quality and decrease costs.
To encourage physicians to join more organized systems of care and to attain the critical mass necessary for 
the viability of such organizations, it will be important to provide physicians with a supportive environment. Many 
of the GEM organizations, for example, offer incentives for professional development, teaching, and research, which 
many physicians value. In addition, physicians practicing within a GEM organization receive professional support 
through periodic reviews, discussions about quality improvement and teamwork, relatively stable compensation, and 
administrative support.
Policy Facilitators
Implementing accountable, coordinated care will be very difficult in the current fee-for-service payment environ-
ment. To encourage such care, the ACO thought leaders believe that policymakers should consider a variety of 
payment models to provide incentives for participation and promote collaboration across providers. Such payment 
changes should align incentives, provide supportive work environments, promote HIT implementation and adop-
tion, and provide the opportunity to receive upside bonuses based on performance measures. While physicians could 
remain in fee-for-service, given the value achieved by more collaborative systems of care, new models of payment 
should make fee-for-service a less desirable option and reward higher-quality care.
Forming integrated systems of care will take substantial time and resources. To encourage movement toward 
ACOs, the ACO thought leaders proposed that the federal government should offer planning grants and technical 
assistance to organizations interested in integrating care. Planning grants would allow organizations interested in 
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integrating care components the opportunity to assess feasibility and then begin planning to implement an ACO in 
their area. Once community providers decide to form such an organization, those who have already achieved suc-
cessful models of integrated care, such as the GEMs, could be very helpful in providing both encouragement and 
technical assistance. Technical assistance could include the provision of proven short-term strategies to reduce costs 
and improve quality or analytic support. Moreover, GEM leaders could assist others with developing a governance 
structure—including how to involve the community in governance—and structuring physician compensation. Many 
of the GEM leaders at the colloquium believe strongly in the efficacy of this model and expressed a willingness to 
participate in technical assistance activities where their guidance and experiences could be translated to other organi-
zations trying to achieve such models of care.
Technical assistance for forming ACOs could also be structured similarly to the Department of Agriculture’s 
Cooperative Extension Program model, such as the model now being used to foster deployment of HIT.16 This fed-
eral/state, public/private collaborative model designates an individual to provide technical assistance to farmers 
within a county, and has been successful in disseminating innovative farming practices.17 The Health Information 
Technology Extension Program is seeking nonprofit regional centers to redesign physician practices and workflow 
to facilitate “meaningful” use of HIT. 18 Similarly structured technical assistance could be provided to physician 
practices seeking to join an ACO. For example, small groups of experts, which could include practitioners, hospital 
administrators, or actuaries, scattered throughout the United States would “train the trainers” to provide regional 
technical assistance to entities forming ACOs. National centers and experts could support these regional extenders 
with payer data and help with the widespread diffusion of novel best practices. Eventually, each state would have at 
least one regional extender, with larger states having more.
Funds available for HIT implementation through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) provide an opportunity for communities to think strategically about how to use the funds to promote integra-
tion. States and localities, for example, could provide ARRA funding for HIT to providers that participate in an ACO. 
In addition, multipayer regional health information organizations (RHIOs) or health information exchanges that share 
data across providers could promote collaboration. GEM leaders could also provide states with their observations on 
what constitutes meaningful HIT.
The ACO thought leaders agreed with the GEM leaders that enterprise liability may reduce concerns regarding 
public reporting and liability and promote integration. Enterprise liability could be coupled with other incentives such 
as HIT and providing liability protection for processes that meet evidence-based guidelines. For example, in 1990, 
providers, consumers, and payers created the Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project, which developed prac-
tice guidelines for physicians in four specialties, with physicians who followed these guidelines being protected from 
medical liability.19 The ACO thought leaders noted that another potential legal model to explore and develop further 
as a strategy for reducing physician liability is the rebuttal presumption of non-liability. This legal concept holds that 
physicians who practice as a part of an ACO provide high-quality, evidence-based care, and therefore should not be 
presumed to be negligent in the provision of that care. This rebuttal does not negate a patient’s ability to seek damages 
as a result of provider negligence, but would place greater burden on the patient to prove a provider’s negligence.20
Next Steps
Some organizations—like the GEMs—currently have the organizational capacity to participate in the ACO initiatives 
outlined in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Others may need more time to develop that capacity and 
to determine which model to replicate to suit the environment in which they practice and the population for which 
they are responsible. To move forward, policymakers could consider a two-track process for implementing account-
able care by allowing organizations and communities that already achieve the goals of ACOs to be part of the first 
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phase of an ACO pilot effort, while experimenting with different accountable care models, such as IPA or commu-
nity-based models, that could be organized and replicated in other areas. Once additional successful models have 
been identified and implemented, policymakers could promote continued learning and innovation within these orga-
nizations by forming learning networks. It is important to note, however, that underlying ACOs is the presumption 
that they are eligible to share in savings achieved by Medicare if they meet certain quality and cost criteria. Meeting 
the definition of an ACO might make an entity eligible for some planning funds, technical assistance, and HIT subsi-
dies, but its long-term success will depend on proof of superior performance.
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